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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs filed 
personal-injury suits against the drug manufacturer Merck 
Sharp & Dohme, alleging that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax 
caused them to suffer serious thigh bone fractures.  Each 
Plaintiff brought a state-law tort claim alleging that Merck 
failed to add an adequate warning of the risk of thigh 
fractures to Fosamax’s FDA-approved drug label.  Many 
Plaintiffs also brought a variety of additional claims including 
defective design, negligence, and breach of warranty. 
 
Plaintiffs’ suits were consolidated for pretrial 
administration in a multi-district litigation in the District of 
New Jersey.  Following discovery and a bellwether trial, the 
District Court granted Merck’s motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that they 
were preempted by federal law.  The District Court based its 
ruling on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine,1 
which holds that state-law failure-to-warn claims are 
preempted when there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would 
not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was 
necessary.   
 
We will vacate and remand.  Preemption is an 
affirmative defense, and Merck has not carried its burden to 
prove that it is entitled to that defense as a matter of law.  The 
Wyeth “clear evidence” standard is demanding and fact-
sensitive.  It requires the factfinder to predict a highly 
probable outcome in a counterfactual world and, therefore, 
requires a court sitting in summary judgment to anticipate 
                                              
1 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
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both the range of conclusions that a reasonable juror might 
reach and the certainty with which the juror would reach 
them.  Here, Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that the FDA would have 
approved a properly-worded warning about the risk of thigh 
fractures—or at the very least, to conclude that the odds of 
FDA rejection were less than highly probable.  Under Wyeth 
and Rule 56, that is enough for Plaintiffs to defeat summary 
judgment and proceed to trial. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Fosamax and Atypical Femoral Fractures 
Fosamax is a drug manufactured by Merck that 
belongs to a class of drugs known as bisphosphonates.  The 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved Fosamax 
in the 1990s for the treatment and prevention of osteoporosis 
in postmenopausal women.   
 
Fosamax treats osteoporosis by correcting an 
imbalance in the so-called “bone remodeling” process.  
Throughout a person’s life, bones are continuously broken 
down through a process called resorption and then reformed 
by the creation of new bone cells.  In postmenopausal 
women, the rate of bone resorption exceeds that of bone 
formation, thereby causing bone loss.  If bone loss continues 
unchecked, a person may develop osteoporosis, “a disease 
characterized by low bone mass and deterioration of bone 
structure that causes bone fragility and increases the risk of 
 6 
 
fracture.”2  Bisphosphonates like Fosamax slow the 
resorption process, restoring the balance between resorption 
and formation and reducing the risk of osteoporotic fracture.   
 
Plaintiffs claim, however, that Fosamax can actually 
increase the risk of certain bone fractures.  They allege that 
by slowing resorption, bisphosphonates inhibit bone repair.  
According to Plaintiffs, bones frequently develop so-called 
“microcracks,” which are ordinarily repaired through the 
resorption process.  An accumulation of microcracks can lead 
to incomplete bone fractures called “stress fractures.”  The 
standalone term “stress fracture” typically connotes a fracture 
resulting from excessive loading of a normal bone, and is 
commonly seen in physically active individuals.  A so-called 
“insufficiency stress fracture,” by contrast, is a fracture 
caused by normal loading of poor-quality bone.  Plaintiffs 
claim that while stress fractures typically heal on their own, 
“some Fosamax users who develop insufficiency fractures 
have reduced bone toughness, and Fosamax prevents the 
normal repair of the fracture.”3  According to Plaintiffs, these 
patients may then go on to develop what are known as 
“atypical femoral fractures”: severe, non-traumatic, low-
energy complete fractures of the femur.   
 
Plaintiffs in this case are all Fosamax users who 
suffered atypical femoral fractures.  They allege, among other 
things, that (1) Fosamax caused these atypical fractures by 
slowing the resorption process and allowing microcracks to 
                                              
2 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Bone Health and 
Osteoporosis: A Report of the Surgeon General 41 (2004). 
3 Pls. Br. 15 (citing A 884.) 
 7 
 
accumulate, and (2) Merck was aware of the risk of such 
fractures but acted unlawfully by failing to warn doctors and 
patients of those dangers.  They claim that Merck should have 
included a warning about atypical femoral fractures in the 
federally-mandated drug warnings that accompany 
prescription drugs.  The interplay, and potential collision, 
between state-law warning duties and federal regulatory 
requirements is the subject of this appeal. 
B. Regulatory Framework 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)4 
regulates the marketing and sale of prescription drugs in the 
United States.  Under the FDCA, a manufacturer must obtain 
approval from the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) before marketing a new drug.5  As 
part of a new drug application, the manufacturer must submit 
a proposed package insert, commonly called the “drug label,” 
that sets out the drug’s medical uses (“indications”) and 
health risks.6  “To obtain FDA approval, drug companies 
generally must submit evidence from clinical trials and other 
testing that evaluate the drug’s risks and benefits and 
demonstrate that it is safe and effective for all of the 
indications ‘prescribed, recommended, or suggested’ on the 
drug’s label.”7  The FDA’s approval of a new drug 
                                              
4 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. 
5 Id. § 355(a). 
6 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a); 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F). 
7 In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer 
Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 355(d)). 
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application is conditioned on its approval of the exact text of 
the drug label.8 
 
Drug labels includes two sections relevant to this 
litigation: a “Warnings and Precautions” section and an 
“Adverse Reactions” section.  The Warnings and Precautions 
section must describe “clinically significant adverse 
reactions,” including any that are “serious even if 
infrequent.”9  The Adverse Reactions section requires a 
description of “the overall adverse reaction profile of the drug 
based on the entire safety database,” including a list of all 
“undesirable effect[s], reasonably associated with use of a 
drug.”10   
 
After a drug is approved, the FDA retains the authority 
to approve or require amendments to the drug’s label.11  The 
fundamental premise of the federal drug labeling scheme, 
however, is that “manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary 
                                              
8 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b), (c). 
9 Id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). 
10 Id. § 201.57(c)(7). 
11 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4); 21; C.F.R. § 314.93; see also Wyeth, 
555 U.S. at 567 (observing that the 2007 FDCA amendments 
“granted the FDA statutory authority to require a 
manufacturer to change its drug label based on safety 
information that becomes available after a drug’s initial 
approval”). 
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responsibility for their drug labeling at all times.”12  The 
manufacturer is charged not only “with crafting an adequate 
label” as an initial matter, but also “with ensuring that its 
warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the 
market.”13 
 
A manufacturer can fulfill its responsibility to revise 
the warnings on a drug label in two ways.   
 
First, the “Changes Being Effected” (“CBE”) 
regulation permits a manufacturer to unilaterally change a 
drug label to reflect “newly acquired information,” subject to 
later FDA review and approval.14  Under the CBE regulation, 
the manufacturer may, upon filing a supplemental application 
with the FDA, change a label to “add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction”; it 
need not wait for FDA approval.15  To add a warning to the 
Warnings and Precautions section through a CBE submission, 
“there need only be ‘reasonable’ evidence of a causal 
association with the drug, a standard that could be met by a 
                                              
12 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(I) 
(“Rule of construction” clarifying that the 2007 amendments 
to the FDCA “shall not be construed to affect the 
responsibility of the responsible person . . . to maintain its 
label in accordance with existing requirements”).   
13 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571. 
14 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 
568 (discussing CBE amendment process).   
15 Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).   
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wide range of evidence.”16  Thus, a manufacturer can amend 
the label to address potential adverse effects even if the 
evidence for a causal connection would “not also support a 
higher evidentiary standard, such as a finding that there is a 
‘preponderance’ of evidence that a product actually causes a 
particular kind of adverse event.”17   
For purposes of the CBE regulation, “newly acquired 
information” includes “new analyses of previously submitted 
data.”18  This definition “accounts for the fact that risk 
information accumulates over time and that the same data 
may take on a different meaning in light of subsequent 
developments.”19  Thus, if a manufacturer were to 
“determine[ ] that existing warnings were insufficient based 
on . . . a new analysis of previously submitted data, [it] could 
still submit a CBE based on its new analysis of the previous 
data.”20  A manufacturer’s ability to change a label via the 
CBE process is not absolute, however. The FDA reviews 
                                              
16 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008) (FDA notice 
regarding final amendment to CBE regulation); see also 21 
C.F.R. 201.57(c)(6)(iii) (Warnings and Precautions section 
“must be revised to include a warning about a clinically 
significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a 
causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need not 
have been definitely established.”). 
17 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,604. 
18 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b).   
19 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 569.   
20 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,606.   
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CBE submissions and retains the power to reject proposed 
changes that do not meet the regulatory standards.21   
 
Second, manufacturers can implement “major 
changes” to a label by filing a so-called “Prior Approval 
Supplement” (“PAS”).22  Unlike a CBE change, a PAS 
change requires prior FDA approval before it can be 
implemented.23  The key distinction for present purposes is 
that a proposed label change that qualifies for a CBE 
supplement—including a proposal to “add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction”—
need not be submitted through the PAS process and does not 
require prior FDA approval.24 
 
It is important to recognize, however, that the FDA 
does not simply approve warnings out of an abundance of 
caution whenever the manufacturer posits a theoretical 
association between drug use and an adverse event.  As the 
FDA has recognized, “[e]xaggeration of risk, or inclusion of 
speculative or hypothetical risks, could discourage 
appropriate use of a beneficial drug.”25  Moreover, “labeling 
that includes theoretical hazards not well-grounded in 
scientific evidence can cause meaningful risk information to 
lose its significance.”26  Accordingly, the FDA will reject a 
                                              
21 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(4)-(6). 
22 Id. § 314.70(b).   
23 Id. § 314.70(b)(3). 
24 Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A); id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) . 
25 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2851 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
26 Id. 
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PAS application or CBE amendment if there is insufficient 
evidence of a causal link between drug use and the adverse 
event.27  
 
C. Fosamax Labeling History 
Both Merck and the FDA have long been aware that 
anti-resorptive drugs like Fosamax could theoretically 
increase the risk of atypical femoral fractures.  The question 
that both Merck and the FDA faced in the years following the 
drug’s approval was whether the developing evidence of a 
causal link between Fosamax and atypical fractures was 
strong enough to require adding a warning to the Fosamax 
drug label.  As explained further in Section II of this opinion, 
the primary question in this appeal is whether, prior to 
September 2010, the FDA would have rejected an attempt by 
Merck to unilaterally amend the Fosamax label (via a CBE 
submission) to include a warning about the risk of atypical 
femoral fractures.  The following evidence bears on that 
question. 
 
i. Early Studies Suggest a Possible Link 
Between Fosamax and Atypical Femoral 
Fractures 
During Fosamax’s development, Merck scientists and 
third-party researchers discussed the possibility that anti-
resorptive drugs could inhibit a bone’s ability to repair 
microdamage, potentially leading to stress fractures.  In 1992, 
prior to FDA approval, Merck informed the FDA that 
“antiresorptive agents may inhibit microdamage repair by 
                                              
27 Id.  
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preventing . . . bone resorption at the sites of microdamage.”28  
Nonetheless, when the FDA approved Fosamax in 1995 for 
the treatment of osteoporosis in postmenopausal women, it 
did not require Merck to include a warning about bone 
fractures.  Nor did it do so in 1997, when it approved 
Fosamax for the prevention of osteoporosis in 
postmenopausal women.   
 
Between 1995 and 2010, scores of case studies, 
reports, and articles were published documenting possible 
connections between long-term bisphosphonate use and 
atypical femoral fractures.  Plaintiffs have directed our 
attention to six such studies from this period.  None of these 
studies, however, concluded that Fosamax caused bone 
fractures, or even that Fosamax use was definitively 
associated with atypical fractures.  Rather, they variously 
stated that Fosamax use “may . . . potentially” increase the 
risk of fracture29 or “may be associated” with insufficiency 
fractures,30 or that certain findings “raise[d] the possibility” 
that Fosamax use led to fractures.31  Merck’s assertion that 
the link between Fosamax and fracturing “remained 
hypothetical and unsubstantiated”32 may be an 
understatement, but not even Plaintiffs suggest that there was 
definitive proof of a causal connection at this time.  
  
                                              
28 A 1774.   
29 A 1258. 
30 A 1237. 
31 A 1243. 
32 Merck Br. 8. 
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Merck kept the FDA informed of these and other 
studies suggesting a possible association between 
bisphosphonates and fractures, either citing or submitting 
them in communications with the agency.  In March 2008, 
Merck submitted a periodic safety update to the FDA that 
included over 30 pages of information regarding atypical 
femur fractures and suppression of bone turnover.  Merck 
reported that “recent publications” had “implicated a link 
between prolonged bisphosphonate therapy and atypical low-
energy non-vertebral fractures.”33  It also stated “the reporters 
related these findings to severely suppressed bone turnover 
that may develop during long-term” use of Fosamax.34    
Later that month, Merck forwarded to the FDA a letter 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine describing 
a “potential link between [bisphosphonate] use and low-
energy fractures of the femur.”35 
 
In June 2008, the FDA informed Merck that it was 
“aware of reports regarding the occurrence of subtrochanteric 
hip fractures in patients using bisphosphonates.”36 It also 
stated that it was “concerned about this developing safety 
signal.”37  The FDA asked Merck to submit any 
investigations it had conducted or reports it had received 
regarding femoral fractures.  Merck promptly complied.   
 
                                              
33 A 2597. 
34 Id. 
35 A 1928-33. 
36 A 1935. 
37 Id. 
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ii. Merck Attempts to Amend the Fosamax 
Label 
In September 2008, while the FDA was analyzing 
Merck’s data, Merck submitted a PAS to the FDA.  As 
discussed above, a PAS is a label-change request that, unlike 
a CBE submission, requires prior approval from the FDA.38  
In the PAS, Merck proposed to add language to both the 
Warnings & Precautions and the Adverse Reactions sections 
of the label to address atypical femoral fractures.  Merck 
explained that “[i]t is not possible with the present data to 
establish whether treatment with” Fosamax “increases the risk 
of [these] . . .  low-energy subtrochanteric and/or proximal 
shaft fractures.”39  But because of the temporal association 
between these fractures and Fosamax use, Merck believed 
that it was “important to include an appropriate statement 
about them in the product label” to “increase physicians’ 
awareness of possible fractures in some osteoporotic patients 
at risk and allow early intervention, thereby possibly 
preventing the progression to complete fracture and/or other 
complications.”40   
 
Merck proposed adding the following language to the 
Warnings and Precautions section of the label: 
 
Low-Energy Femoral Shaft Fracture 
                                              
38 See supra Section I.B. 
39 A 1349. 
40 Id. 
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Low-energy fractures of the subtrochanteric and 
proximal femoral shaft have been reported in a 
small number of bisphosphonate-treated 
patients. Some were stress fractures (also 
known as insufficiency fractures) occurring in 
the absence of trauma. Some patients 
experienced prodromal pain in the affected area, 
often associated with imaging features of stress 
fracture, weeks to months before a complete 
fracture occurred. The number of reports of this 
condition is very low, and stress fractures with 
similar clinical features also have occurred in 
patients not treated with bisphosphonates. 
Patients with suspected stress fractures should 
be evaluated, including evaluation for known 
causes and risk factors (e.g., vitamin D 
deficiency, malabsorption, glucocorticoid use, 
previous stress fracture, lower extremity 
arthritis or fracture, extreme or increased 
exercise, diabetes mellitus, chronic alcohol 
abuse), and receive appropriate orthopedic care. 
Interruption of bisphosphonate therapy in 
patients with stress fractures should be 
considered, pending evaluation of the patient, 
based on individual benefit/risk assessment.41   
Merck also proposed adding “low-energy femoral 
shaft fracture” to the list of reported adverse reactions in the 
Adverse Reactions section of the label,42 as well as the 
following statement to the Patient Package Insert: “Patients 
                                              
41 A 1371. 
42 A 1383. 
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have experienced fracture in a specific part of the thigh bone. 
Call your doctor if you develop new or unusual pain in the 
hip or thigh.”43  In support of its PAS application, Merck 
included an analysis of femur fractures in Fosamax users and 
cited to nine articles reporting cases of low-energy femoral 
fractures in Fosamax users.   
 
In April 2009, Merck representatives held a telephone 
conversation with Dr. Scott Monroe of the FDA.  According 
to Merck’s internal notes, Dr. Monroe stated that the FDA 
could agree to add language in the Adverse Reactions section 
of the label, but that Merck’s “elevation of this issue to a 
precaution in the labeling” was prolonging review.44  The 
FDA wanted “to approach the issue of a precaution from the 
[perspective] of all bisphosphonates” and was “working with 
the Office of Safety and Epidemiology to do so.”45  Dr. 
Monroe also stated that because “the conflicting nature of the 
literature does not provide a clear path forward, . . . more time 
will be need[ed] for FDA to formulate a formal opinion on 
the issue of a precaution around these data.”46 
 
Later in April 2009, an FDA liaison sent Merck an e-
mail stating that the FDA was not prepared to include 
language about low-energy femoral fractures in the Warnings 
and Precautions section of the label and would only approve a 
reference to atypical fractures in the “Adverse Reaction” 
                                              
43 A 2742. 
44 A 1970-71. 
45 A 1971. 
46 Id. 
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section.47  The FDA asked Merck to “hold off on the 
[Warnings and Precautions] language at this time” so that 
drug evaluators could “then work with [the FDA’s Office of 
Surveillance and Epidemiology] and Merck to decide on 
language for a [Warnings and Precautions] atypical fracture 
language, if it is warranted.”48 
 
In May 2009, the FDA sent Merck a “Complete 
Response” letter, authored by Dr. Monroe.  In the Complete 
Response, the FDA approved the addition of “low energy 
femoral shaft and subtrochanteric fractures” to the Adverse 
Reactions section, but the FDA rejected Merck’s proposed 
addition to the Warnings and Precautions section.  Because 
the parties vigorously dispute the grounds for this rejection, it 
is worth excerpting the relevant portion of the FDA notice in 
full: 
                                              
47 A 1498. 
48 Id. 
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We have completed the review of your [PAS] 
applications, as amended, and have determined 
that we cannot approve these applications in 
their present form. We have described below 
our reasons for this action and our 
recommendation to address this issue. 
1.  While the Division agrees that atypical and 
subtrochanteric fractures should be added to the 
ADVERSE REACTIONS, Post-Marketing 
Experience subsections of the [Fosamax] 
labels, your justification for the proposed 
PRECAUTIONS section language is 
inadequate.  Identification of “stress fractures” 
may not be clearly related to the atypical 
subtrochanteric fractures that have been 
reported in the literature.  Discussion of the risk 
factors for stress fractures is not warranted and 
is not adequately supported by the available 
literature and post-marketing adverse event 
reporting.49 
The outcome of this case hinges in large part on how 
one reads (or really, on how a reasonable jury could read) this 
language in conjunction with the FDA’s accompanying 
actions and communications.  Plaintiffs claim that the FDA 
was objecting only to Merck’s use of the imprecise and 
potentially misleading term “stress fractures,” and that the 
FDA would have approved a proposed warning that 
specifically discussed the risk of atypical femoral fractures 
while eliminating the general references to stress fractures.  
                                              
49 A 1500-01. 
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Merck claims that this letter, along with the FDA’s other 
communications, demonstrates that the FDA simply did not 
believe there was sufficient evidence of a causal link between 
Fosamax use and atypical fractures, and would have rejected 
any proposed warning relating to such a risk. 
 
iii. The FDA Revises its Position on the 
Link Between Bisphosphonates and 
Atypical Femur Fractures 
In March 2010, after reviewing the data submitted by 
Merck and other manufacturers, the FDA stated publicly that 
the data reviewed to date had “not shown a clear connection 
between bisphosphonate use and a risk of atypical 
subtrochanteric femur fractures.”50  The FDA announced that 
it would work with an outside expert task force to gather 
additional information.   
 
In September 2010, the task force published a report 
finding that “there is evidence of a relationship between long-
term [bisphosphonate] use and a specific type of 
subtrochanteric and femoral shaft fracture.”51  The report 
stated that although there was an association between long-
term bisphosphonate use and atypical fractures, the 
association had not been proven to be causal.  The FDA 
responded by issuing a Drug Safety Communication stating 
that, “[a]lthough it is not clear if bisphosphonates are the 
cause [of fractures], these unusual femur fractures have been 
identified in patients taking these drugs.”52  Regarding the 
                                              
50 A 1508. 
51 A 1167. 
52 A 1512. 
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task force’s recommendation of a label change, the FDA 
stated that it “has assembled and is thoroughly reviewing all 
long term data available on the products, as well as all safety 
reports” and would be “considering label revisions.”53  
 
In October 2010, the FDA announced that it would 
require all bisphosphonate manufacturers to add information 
regarding the risk of atypical femoral fractures to the 
Warnings and Precautions section of the drug labels, based on 
the FDA’s conclusion that “these atypical fractures may be 
related to long-term . . . bisphosphonate use.”54  It reiterated 
that it was still “not clear if bisphosphonates are the cause,” 
but noted that “these unusual femur fractures have been 
predominantly reported in patients taking bisphosphonates.”55  
In a conference call accompanying the announcement, the 
FDA’s Deputy Director of the Office of New Drugs stated 
that the task force report made the FDA “confident” that 
atypical femur fractures are “potentially more closely related 
to” long-term use of bisphosphonates “than [the FDA] 
previously had evidence for.”56   
 
                                              
53 Id. 
54 A 1118.  The FDA also announced that it would require a 
new Limitations of Use statement in the Indications and 
Usage section of the labels to “describe the uncertainty of the 
optimal duration of use of bisphosphonates for the treatment 
and/or prevention of osteoporosis.”  Id. 
55 Id. 
56 A 1396. 
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The same day, the FDA wrote to Merck requesting that 
Merck add the following language to the Warnings and 
Precautions section of the Fosamax label: 
 
Atypical Subtrochanteric and Diaphyseal 
Femoral Fractures:  
Atypical, low-energy, or low trauma 
fractures of the femoral shaft have been 
reported in bisphosphonate-treated patients. 
These fractures can occur anywhere in the 
femoral shaft from just below the lesser 
trochanter to above the supracondylar flare and 
are transverse or short oblique in orientation 
without evidence of comminution. Causality 
has not been established as these fractures also 
occur in osteoporotic patients who have not 
been treated with bisphosphonates.  
Atypical femur fractures most commonly 
occur with minimal or no impact to the affected 
area. They may be bilateral and many patients 
report prodromal pain in the affected area, 
usually presenting as dull, aching thigh pain, 
weeks to months before a complete fracture 
occurs. A number of reports note that patients 
were also receiving treatment with 
glucocorticoids (e.g. prednisone) at the time of 
fracture.  
Any patient with a history of 
bisphosphonate exposure who presents with 
thigh or groin pain should be suspected of 
having an atypical fracture and should be 
 23 
 
evaluated to rule out a femur fracture. Subjects 
presenting with an atypical fracture should also 
be assessed for symptoms and signs of fracture 
in the contralateral limb. Interruption of 
bisphosphonate therapy should be considered, 
pending a risk/benefit assessment, on an 
individual basis.57 
Merck responded by proposing additional language 
that, according to Merck, was intended to make clear that 
doctors should attempt to rule out stress fractures.  The 
proposal contained five specific references to “stress 
fractures.”  The FDA responded to this proposal by 
eliminating every instance of the phrase “stress fractures.”  In 
rejecting Merck’s proposal, the FDA explained that “the term 
‘stress fracture’ was considered and not accepted.  The 
Division believes that for most practitioners, the term ‘stress 
fracture’ represents a minor fracture and this would contradict 
the seriousness of the atypical femoral fractures associated 
with bisphosphonate use.”58  The FDA subsequently 
approved language nearly identical to its original October 
2010 proposal.  That language was added to the Fosamax 
label in January 2011 and has remained there since.   
 
D. Procedural History  
After the label change, patients who had taken 
Fosamax and suffered atypical femur fractures filed lawsuits 
against Merck throughout the country.  In May 2011, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these 
                                              
57 A 1516-17. 
58 A 1540. 
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cases for pre-trial administration in a multi-district litigation 
(“MDL”) in the District of New Jersey.59  Since then, the 
MDL has been assigned to three different district judges60 and 
has swelled to over 1,000 cases, each involving a separate 
patient who allegedly suffered a femur fracture after taking 
Fosamax. 
 
Although no two complaints in the MDL are identical, 
all of the actions “share questions of fact arising from similar 
allegations that use of Fosamax . . . caused femur fractures or 
similar bone injuries.”61  The individual Plaintiffs in this 
appeal all allege that they were injured before September 14, 
2010, the date the outside expert task force published its 
report documenting an association between bisphosphonate 
use and atypical femur fractures.  According to Plaintiffs,62  
the complaints filed by this cohort generally include a state-
law products liability claim for failure to warn, alleging that 
Fosamax was defective because Merck failed to warn 
Plaintiffs and their physicians about the risk of atypical femur 
fractures. Many complaints also claim that Fosamax was 
                                              
59 In re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. 
(No. II), 787 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (hereinafter, 
“Fosamax MDL Order”). 
60 The MDL is currently assigned to the Honorable Freda 
Wolfson.   
61 Fosamax MDL Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. 
62 This appeal involves over 500 related cases, and the parties 
have wisely chosen not to include each complaint in the 
record.  We are therefore necessarily reliant on the parties for 
information regarding the nature, prevalence and 
commonality of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
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defectively designed because the risks of Fosamax exceeded 
the benefits, or because Fosamax was unreasonably 
dangerous or more dangerous than an ordinary consumer 
would expect.  Many complaints also include claims for, 
among other causes of action, negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of express and implied warranties, 
unjust enrichment, punitive damages, and violations of state 
consumer fraud and deceptive trade practice statutes.63   
 
Merck has argued since the inception of the MDL that 
Plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted by 
FDA regulations.  The District Court decided to address 
preemption after developing a full record in a bellwether trial, 
the so-called Glynn trial.  Typical of all plaintiffs in this 
MDL, the lead plaintiff in Glynn claimed that she suffered an 
atypical femur fracture that was proximately caused by 
Merck’s failure to include adequate fracture warnings on the 
Fosamax label.64  Merck moved for judgment as a matter of 
law on preemption grounds before and during trial, but the 
District Court reserved judgment.65  The jury returned a 
verdict for Merck on the merits, finding that Ms. Glynn failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
                                              
63 Although the complaints exclusively plead state-law causes 
of action, the actions are in federal court on diversity grounds. 
64 Although the Glynn plaintiffs brought multiple claims, the 
only one they actually tried to verdict was a failure-to-warn 
claim.  In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. 
Litig. (Glynn v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.), 951 F. Supp. 
2d 695, 700 & n.5 (D.N.J. 2013) (hereinafter, “Glynn”).   
65 Id. at 700-701. 
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experienced an atypical femur fracture.66  Despite this verdict, 
the District Court announced that it would still decide 
whether the Glynns’ claims were preempted.67  
 
In June 2013, the District Court issued an opinion 
concluding that the Glynns’ failure-to-warn claim was 
preempted by federal law.  Applying the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wyeth, the court stated that state-law failure-to-
warn claims are preempted when “there is ‘clear evidence that 
the FDA would not have approved a change’ to the 
prescription drug’s label.”68  The District Court concluded 
that the Glynns’ claim was preempted because the FDA’s 
May 2009 denial of Merck’s request to add language about 
atypical femur fractures to the Warnings and Precautions 
section of the label was “clear evidence that the FDA would 
not have approved a label change to the Precautions section 
of the label prior to Ms. Glynn’s injury.”69  
 
Shortly after the Glynn decision, Merck moved for an 
order to show cause why all the cases in the MDL alleging 
injuries prior to the release of the September 2010 task force 
report should not be dismissed on preemption grounds.  
Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the ground that resolving 
their claims through a show-cause procedure would violate 
their due process right to individual trials.  In August 2013, 
the District Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the 
                                              
66 Id. at 701. 
67 Id. 
68 Glynn, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 
571).   
69 Id. at 703. 
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pre-September 2010 claims should not be dismissed on 
preemption grounds, and the parties submitted briefing.  
Although both sides disputed the propriety of the show-cause 
procedure and the substance of Merck’s preemption 
arguments, the parties and the District Court all agreed that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “provides the exclusive 
mechanism by which the Court can resolve the dispositive 
issues presented by Merck’s preemption defense before 
trial(s).”70  
 
After briefing, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Merck and ruled that all claims made by 
plaintiffs who were injured prior to September 14, 2010 were 
preempted under Wyeth.  Specifically, the court ruled that: (1) 
Merck had met its initial burden of demonstrating that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to preemption in 
Glynn, and that Plaintiffs therefore bore the burden of 
producing a genuine issue for trial; (2) Plaintiffs had failed to 
create a genuine issue as to preemption; (3) it was proper to 
use a show-cause proceeding to apply the Glynn preemption 
ruling to other MDL cases; (4) Plaintiffs’ design-defect and 
other non-warning claims were also preempted because they 
sounded in failure to warn; and (5) Plaintiffs’ alternate 
theories that Merck should have added information about 
fractures to the Adverse Reactions section of the label prior to 
                                              
70 In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
MDL No. 2243, Master Dkt. No. 08-08 (JAP)(LHG), 2014 
WL 1266994, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014) (hereinafter, 
“Summary Judgment Order”).  The parties continue to agree 
that Rule 56 is the proper framework to apply, although they 
dispute how to apportion the parties’ burdens of production 
and persuasion. 
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2009 and should have warned that Fosamax’s long-term 
benefits were limited should be dismissed.   
 
With respect to the failure-to-warn claims, the District 
Court reiterated its conclusion from Glynn that “the fact that 
the FDA never required [Merck] to submit new language or 
change the label demonstrates that the FDA did not think that 
the label should have been changed at that time.”71  This 
evidence “remain[ed] unchanged” and provided “clear 
evidence that the FDA would have rejected a stronger 
Precautions warning because the FDA did reject a stronger 
Precautions warning.”72  As to the non-failure-to-warn claims 
(including claims for design defect, negligence, fraud, breach 
of warranty, deceptive trade practice, and unjust enrichment), 
the District Court concluded that that these claims “are based 
entirely on the premise that Fosamax had risks which should 
have been disclosed to consumers” and therefore “ultimately 
hinge[ ] on the adequacy of Fosamax’s warning.”73  Because 
these claims “rise and fall with a claim for failure to warn,” 
they too were preempted.74  This appeal followed.75 
                                              
71 Id. at *16 (quoting Glynn, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04) 
(alterations omitted). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at *12, *14. 
74 Id. at *12, *14. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The primary issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs’ 
state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted by federal law 
under the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth.  This is not a 
straightforward determination.  Wyeth says only that a claim 
is preempted when there is “clear evidence” that the FDA 
would not have approved a label change.  This standard is 
cryptic and open-ended, and lower courts have struggled to 
make it readily administrable.  This appeal, however, requires 
us to do so.   To assess whether Merck is entitled to summary 
judgment on its affirmative preemption defense, we must 
answer two questions:  What is “clear evidence”?  And who 
should determine whether clear evidence exists?  
 
                                                                                                     
75 This appeal involves only those Plaintiffs who alleged that 
they were injured before September 14, 2010.  See, e.g., id. at 
*17 (granting summary judgment to Merck on “all claims 
made by the Plaintiffs . . . with injuries that occurred prior to 
September 14, 2010”).  Plaintiffs inform us that there are 
“approximately 570 remaining cases in the MDL involving 
plaintiffs who were injured after September 14, 2010.”  Pls. 
Br. 8; see also A 2067-80.  In June 2015, the District Court 
conditionally dismissed these remaining actions without 
prejudice, concluding that they “are based on the alleged 
inadequacy of the pre-2011 Fosamax label” and that our 
decision here would “determine whether the claims of the 
remaining Plaintiffs in this litigation . . . remain viable or 
not.”  A 2065.  We express no view regarding the effect of 
today’s ruling on the remaining plaintiffs’ claims. 
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For the following reasons, we conclude that (1) the 
term “clear evidence” refers solely to the applicable standard 
of proof, and (2) the ultimate question of whether the FDA 
would have rejected a label change is a question of fact for 
the jury rather than for the court.  By describing the ultimate 
question as one of fact for the jury, we do not mean to suggest 
that summary judgment is categorically unavailable to a 
manufacturer asserting a preemption defense.  When there is 
no genuine issue of material fact—that is, when no reasonable 
jury applying the clear-evidence standard of proof could 
conclude that the FDA would have approved a label change—
the manufacturer will be entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.   We simply hold that, at the summary judgment stage, 
the court cannot decide for itself whether the FDA would 
have rejected a change, but must instead ask whether a 
reasonable jury could find that the FDA would have approved 
the change.  
  
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine: Impossibility 
Preemption and the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Wyeth v. Levine 
i. Impossibility Preemption 
The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law 
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”76  The Supremacy 
Clause, therefore, preempts “state laws that ‘interfere with, or 
are contrary to,’ federal law.”77    There are several varieties 
                                              
76 U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.   
77 Hillsborough Cty., Florida v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 
471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
1, 211 (1824)). 
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of preemption; the one at issue here is called “conflict” or 
“impossibility” preemption.   Impossibility preemption 
applies, and state law must give way, when “it is ‘impossible 
for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements.’”78  “The question for ‘impossibility’ is 
whether the private party could independently do under 
federal law what state law requires of it.”79   
 
In this case, Plaintiffs claim that state law obligated 
Merck to add a warning about atypical femur fractures to the 
Fosamax label.  At issue is whether federal law—here, FDA 
regulations—prevented Merck from adding the type of 
warnings that Plaintiffs claim were required under state law.  
The Supreme Court confronted a similar question in Wyeth, 
and its opinion governs our analysis here.  
 
ii. The Wyeth Decision 
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court addressed whether and to 
what extent state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted by 
the FDCA and federal drug-labeling regulations.  The Court 
held that failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers 
generally are not preempted by FDA approval of the drug’s 
warning label.  But such a claim is preempted by federal law 
when there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have 
approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary. 
 
The plaintiff in Wyeth developed gangrene when a 
physician’s assistant injected her with the antinausea drug 
                                              
78 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 618 (2011) (quoting 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).   
79 Id. at 620. 
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Phenergan.  She brought a state-law failure-to-warn claim 
against Wyeth, the manufacturer of Phenergan, for failing to 
provide an adequate warning about the risks involved with 
various methods of administering the drug.  A jury concluded 
that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by Wyeth’s inadequate 
warning label.   Wyeth argued on appeal that the state-law 
failure-to-warn claims were preempted because it was 
impossible to comply with both state-law warning duties and 
federal labeling obligations.80 
 
The Supreme Court rejected Wyeth’s argument.  It 
began by citing the “central premise of federal drug 
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the 
content of its label at all times.”81  Under this rule, a 
manufacturer “is charged both with crafting an adequate label 
and with ensuring that its warnings remain adequate as long 
as the drug is on the market.”82  Thus, when the risks of a 
particular drug use become apparent, the manufacturer has “a 
duty to provide a warning that adequately describe[s] that 
risk.”83   
 
In response to Wyeth’s contention that federal law 
made it impossible to add the warnings the plaintiff claimed 
were necessary, the Court observed that drug manufacturers 
are allowed to strengthen an FDA-approved warning label 
without FDA approval through the CBE process.84  Wyeth 
                                              
80 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559-64. 
81 Id. at 570-71. 
82 Id. at 571.   
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 568.   
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therefore could not establish impossibility preemption 
because the CBE regulation “permitted [Wyeth] to provide . . 
. a warning [of the risk of gangrene] before receiving the 
FDA’s approval.”85  
  
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the mere 
availability of a CBE label amendment would not always 
defeat a manufacturer’s preemption defense, because the 
FDA “retains authority to reject labeling changes.”86  Thus, 
where there is “clear evidence that the FDA would not have 
approved a change” to the label, federal law preempts state-
law claims premised on the manufacturer’s failure to make 
that change.87  Impossibility preemption applies in that 
instance because the manufacturer would be legally prevented 
by the FDA from taking the very action that state law 
ostensibly requires.88  
  
                                              
85 Id. at 571. 
86 Id.   
87 Id. 
88 If a manufacturer retains a warning that the FDA has 
rejected, the drug may be deemed “misbranded” in violation 
of federal law.  See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (drug shall be 
considered misbranded “[i]f its labeling is false or misleading 
in any particular”); A 1501 (FDA letter rejecting Merck’s 
PAS proposal to amend the Fosamax label and stating that 
“[t]hese products may be considered to be misbranded under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act if they are 
marketed with this change before approval of these 
supplemental applications”). 
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The manufacturer in Wyeth could not take advantage 
of the clear-evidence exception because it had “offered no 
such evidence” that the FDA would have rejected the warning 
sought by the plaintiff.89  But the Supreme Court made it 
clear that if a manufacturer does present “clear evidence” that 
the FDA would reject a plaintiff’s proposed warning, it would 
have a complete preemption defense to any state-law failure-
to-warn claims.   
 
In this case, Merck claims that the FDA’s 2009 
rejection of its proposed label amendment is just such “clear 
evidence.” 
 
B. Defining “Clear Evidence” 
Courts applying the Wyeth preemption rule confront an 
immediate question: what is “clear evidence that the FDA 
would not have approved a change”?  The Wyeth Court did 
not define the “clear evidence” standard or explain how 
courts should apply it.  The only guidance the Court offered 
was to call impossibility preemption a “demanding 
defense.”90  In the absence of explicit direction or a coherent 
doctrinal framework, lower courts have been understandably 
reluctant to articulate firm definitions of the standard or its 
requirements.  For example, several of our sister circuits have 
decided preemption cases by simply treating the facts of 
Wyeth as a yardstick: if the evidence for FDA rejection in a 
given case is less compelling than the manufacturer’s 
evidence in Wyeth, the thinking goes, then there is clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a label 
                                              
89 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571-72.   
90 Id. at 573. 
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change and the manufacturer’s preemption defense fails.91  
Many district courts have adopted a similar, if more complex, 
approach of exhaustively surveying the post-Wyeth case law 
and then testing the facts of a particular case against prior 
decisions.92  Both approaches produce valid outcomes in 
individual cases, but neither clarifies or builds out the 
doctrine.  The result is an anomaly in our preemption 
jurisprudence: the number of cases applying the clear 
evidence standard continues to grow, yet “the clear evidence 
standard remains undefined.”93 
 
                                              
91 See Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 
392-96 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that Wyeth provides an 
“intellectual anchor” because “if the evidence here is less 
compelling than it was in [Wyeth], we will not find 
preemption,” and holding that preemption was unwarranted 
because the manufacturer’s evidence was not “any more 
compelling”); Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 
1235-37 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing that “the only guidance 
this court has is that the evidence presented in [Wyeth] was 
insufficient to meet the clear evidence standard” and holding 
that preemption was unwarranted “[b]ecause the evidence 
presented by Perrigo in this case is no more compelling than 
the evidence considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in 
[Wyeth]” (abrogated on other grounds, PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604). 
92 See, e.g., In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2015); Seufert v. 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., No. 13-cv-2169 AJB (MDD), 
2016 WL 3369512 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). 
93 In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 142 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1119. 
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Today, we hold that the Supreme Court intended to 
announce a standard of proof when it used the term “clear 
evidence” in Wyeth.   
 
The Wyeth Court articulated the “clear evidence” 
exception as follows:  “[A]bsent clear evidence that the FDA 
would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we 
will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply 
with both federal and state requirements.”94  This formula has 
three components: (1) a legal rule that defines the 
circumstances in which a manufacturer is absolved of state-
law liability (it must be impossible for the manufacturer to 
comply with both federal and state requirements); (2) a 
factual showing that satisfies the legal rule (the FDA would 
not have approved the proposed label change); and (3) a 
standard of proof that specifies how convincing the factual 
showing must be (the manufacturer must show that the FDA 
would not have approved the proposed label change by “clear 
evidence”).  The term “clear evidence” therefore does not 
refer directly to the type of facts that a manufacturer must 
show, or to the circumstances in which preemption will be 
appropriate.  Rather, it specifies how difficult it will be for the 
manufacturer to convince the factfinder that the FDA would 
have rejected a proposed label change.  The manufacturer 
must prove that the FDA would have rejected a warning not 
simply by a preponderance of the evidence, as in most civil 
cases, but by “clear evidence.” 
 
Our conclusion that the Wyeth Court intended the term 
“clear evidence” to denote a standard of proof is supported by 
the Supreme Court’s prior usage of the term.  For example, 
                                              
94 555 U.S. at 571.   
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the Court has consistently held that a complainant alleging 
official government misconduct must present “clear 
evidence” of unlawful behavior.95  “Clear evidence” in this 
context is understood to be a standard of proof, rather than a 
condition on the type of facts that must be proven.96  Similar 
examples are found in the bankruptcy and patent settings.97   
                                              
95 See, e.g., United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 
1, 14-15 (1926) (“The presumption of regularity supports the 
official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have 
properly discharged their official duties.”); United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (criminal defendant 
alleging racially discriminatory prosecution must present 
“clear evidence” that prosecutorial policy had discriminatory 
effect and purpose); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (selective 
prosecution claim requires “clear evidence” of unlawful 
action). 
96 See Reno, 525 U.S. at 489 (stating that clear evidence is 
“the standard for proving” a selective prosecution claim); 
United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(describing clear evidence as “[t]he standard of proof” for 
selective prosecution claims). 
97 See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1929) (when a 
party seeks turnover in a bankruptcy proceeding, “[a] mere 
preponderance of evidence . . . is not enough” and the court 
deciding the motion “should therefore require clear 
evidence”); Microsoft v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97, 113-
14 (2011) (Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Patent Act as 
requiring “clear evidence” of invalidity accurately stated the 
statutory standard of proof). 
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Nor must we look far to discern the meaning of “clear 
evidence,” as Supreme Court usage confirms that the term is 
synonymous with “clear and convincing evidence.”98  The 
latter is a well-recognized intermediate standard of proof—
more demanding than preponderance of the evidence, but less 
demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines clear and convincing evidence as 
“evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly 
probable or reasonably certain.”99  We adopt that definition 
here.   It is consistent with both settled understanding and 
Wyeth’s instruction that the clear-evidence test is a 
“demanding defense” meant to represent a longstanding 
“presumption against pre-emption.”100  
  
We therefore conclude that for a defendant to establish 
a preemption defense under Wyeth, the factfinder must 
conclude that it is highly probable that the FDA would not 
have approved a change to the drug’s label. 
 
                                              
98 See Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 97, 113-14  (equating Federal 
Circuit’s “clear evidence” standard with “clear and 
convincing” standard); Oriel, 278 U.S. at 362-63 (equating 
“clear evidence” with “clear and convincing evidence”); 
accord Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 
307-09, 311 (1971) (interpreting statute requiring “clear 
proof” as requiring “clear and convincing evidence”). 
99 Black’s Law Dictionary 674 (10th ed. 2009).   
100 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571-73, 565 n.3.    
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C. Whether the FDA Would Have Rejected a 
Label Change is a Question of Fact for the 
Jury 
Once “clear evidence” is understood as a standard of 
proof rather than a condition on the type of facts to be proven, 
the Wyeth test narrows to a single inquiry: would the FDA 
have approved the label change that Plaintiffs argue was 
required?   
 
Oral argument in this case revealed a fundamental yet 
unexplored disagreement between the parties.  Merck claimed 
that the Wyeth preemption test presents a pure question of law 
that must be decided by a court, not a jury.  Plaintiffs argued 
that Wyeth preemption poses a mixed question of fact and law 
that may require jury factfinding in appropriate 
circumstances.  The distinction is crucial in this case because 
it dictates the course of our summary judgment analysis.  If 
the question of whether the FDA would have rejected 
Plaintiffs’ proposed warning is a question of law for the court, 
then we may simply answer it ourselves; but if it is a question 
of fact for the jury, then we must instead attempt to anticipate 
the range of answers that could be given by reasonable jurors 
applying the clear evidence standard and then determine 
whether summary judgment is appropriate.  Having reviewed 
the case law and the parties’ supplemental briefing on the 
issue, we conclude that the question of whether the FDA 
would have rejected a proposed label change is a question of 
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fact that must be answered by a jury.101  The court’s role at 
the summary judgment stage is therefore limited to 
determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact 
that preclude judgment as a matter of law. 
 
i. Conflict Preemption Can Require Fact 
Determinations by a Jury 
Merck makes two general, threshold arguments in 
favor of treating Wyeth preemption as a purely legal question 
to be answered by the court. 
 
First, Merck notes that the vast majority of courts 
applying Wyeth have assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, 
that Wyeth preemption presents a question of law.  This 
observation is only somewhat accurate and wholly 
unpersuasive. 
 
Wyeth does not indicate whether the “clear evidence” 
test poses a legal or factual question.  Nor is it possible to 
divine a clear answer from the Supreme Court’s application 
                                              
101 Our discussion of the allocation of decision-making 
authority, both here and elsewhere in this Opinion, applies in 
cases tried to a jury.  In a bench trial, of course, judicial 
factfinding will be both appropriate and necessary. 
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of the test in Wyeth itself.102  However, the Supreme Court 
did decide that the evidence presented in Wyeth was not 
sufficient to pass the clear evidence test.  Therefore, in light 
of the Court’s definitive holding that the evidence in Wyeth 
did not pass muster, the many federal courts that have applied 
the Wyeth preemption test have simply compared the 
evidence presented in their cases to the evidence presented in 
Wyeth.  For example, in Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 
the Seventh Circuit walked through the record evidence and 
concluded that, “in light of the extensive showing required by 
[Wyeth],” the manufacturer “did not meet its burden of 
demonstrating by clear evidence that the FDA would have 
                                              
102 Had Wyeth come up on appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, for example, the Court would have been forced to 
address whether the question of what the FDA would have 
done should be answered by a court or by a jury.  But Wyeth 
was an appeal of a post-trial motion for judgment, following a 
full jury trial and post-verdict proceedings in which the trial 
court made explicit fact findings, based on the trial record, 
directed at the preemption issue.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 561-63.  
The Supreme Court concluded on the basis of that complete 
record that there was “no . . . evidence” that the FDA would 
have rejected a warning.  Id. at 572.  The combination of (1) a 
complete fact record that (2) contained zero evidence to 
support preemption eliminated the need for remand, and 
thereby obviated the need to explain which judicial actor 
should make preemption-related findings in the first instance.  
And since the complete record contained no evidence 
whatsoever indicating that the FDA would not have approved 
a label change, the Supreme Court had no reason to consider 
whether a jury could have reached a contrary conclusion.   
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rejected a label change.”103  The Ninth Circuit took a similar 
approach in Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals Co., and 
explicitly stated that since “the only guidance this court has is 
that the evidence presented in [Wyeth] was insufficient to 
meet the clear evidence standard,” the manufacturer would 
not meet the clear evidence standard if the “evidence in this 
case [is] less compelling than [that] in [Wyeth].”104  Many 
other circuits have followed this approach and have found no 
preemption because the evidence in those cases fell short of 
the record in Wyeth.105 
 
It is possible to characterize this approach as a tacit 
acknowledgment that the “clear evidence” test is a legal 
question to be answered directly by the court.  Mason, for 
example, was an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, but 
the court did not engage in a Rule 56 disputed-facts analysis 
                                              
103 Mason, 596 F.3d at 393-96. 
104 Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1235-36. 
105 See, e.g.,  Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 446 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (“The record here contains nothing, let alone ‘clear 
evidence,’ that suggests the FDA would have rejected a 
labeling proposal from Actavis.”); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 
588 F.3d 603, 610-11 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The record contains 
nothing, let alone ‘clear evidence,’ to suggest the FDA would 
have rejected a labeling proposal from any of them.”); but see 
Miller v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 381 F. App’x 776 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (without any prior discussion, 
remanding “to give the [district] court the opportunity to 
make evidentiary findings and analyze the record in light of 
[Wyeth’s] new ‘clear evidence’ standard”).  
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or consider whether a reasonable jury could reach a contrary 
conclusion.  At the same time the court also did not explain 
why the Wyeth test should be resolved by the court in the first 
instance.  We do not lightly discount the wisdom of our sister 
circuits and the district courts that have grappled with these 
issues.  But there is a difference between rejecting another 
court’s considered judgment, on the one hand, and taking up 
an issue that has not been thoroughly analyzed, on the other.  
Furthermore, the approach taken by our sister circuits would 
be entirely consistent with our decision that the “clear 
evidence” test is a fact question that is ultimately for a jury to 
decide.  After all, by comparing the evidence presented in 
these cases with the evidence presented in Wyeth, these 
circuits are in fact engaging in a summary judgment analysis, 
even if they do not name it.  
  
Second, Merck asserts that conflict preemption always 
presents a pure question of law.  To be sure, we have made 
numerous offhand statements that seem to support Merck’s 
position.106  And as Merck points out, several district courts 
relying on similar language have concluded, albeit without 
substantial analysis, that a manufacturer’s entitlement to the 
                                              
106 See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 
364 n.16 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The scope of preemption presents a 
pure question of law, which we review de novo.”); Horn v. 
Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2004) (“This 
Court also exercises plenary review over a district court’s 
preemption determination, as it is a question of law.”). 
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Wyeth preemption defense is a question of law for the court 
rather than the jury.107   
   
The “rule” Merck cites, however, is one of thumb 
rather than law.  It is true that most preemption cases present 
purely legal questions—for example, whether Congress 
intended to preempt state law, how to interpret the scope of 
an express preemption provision, or whether two regulatory 
schemes are facially incompatible.  But it is equally clear that 
preemption can be, and sometimes must be, a fact question 
for the jury.  
  
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.108 illustrates the distinction.  In Boyle, as 
in Wyeth, the Supreme Court defined the scope of conflict 
preemption in a particular setting and announced the factual 
showing that a defendant must make to prove the affirmative 
preemption defense.  Specifically, the Court held that 
“[l]iability for design defects in military equipment cannot be 
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment 
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier 
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the 
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the 
United States.”109  The Court clarified that “whether the facts 
establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the 
                                              
107 See Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1267 
(W.D. Okla. 2011); In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 142 F. Supp. 3d at 1114. 
108 487 U.S. 500 (1988).   
109 Id. at 512. 
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jury.”110  The proper question on summary judgment, 
therefore, was whether a “reasonable jury could, under the 
properly formulated defense, have found for the petitioner on 
the facts presented.”111  It would be error, the Court said, for a 
court to “assess[ ] on its own whether the defense had been 
established.”112   
 
While our court has not gone so far as to declare that 
any one species of preemption defense categorically requires 
jury factfinding, we have acknowledged that the availability 
of the defense can turn on questions of fact.  In MD Mall 
Associates, LLC v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,113 we 
determined that the question of whether state-law storm water 
trespass claims conflicted with federal railroad-safety 
regulations had to be addressed “under the circumstances of 
this particular case.”114  We therefore held that whether the 
defendant railroad could reasonably comply with federal 
drainage requirements while also complying with 
Pennsylvania law regarding storm water trespass “is a 
question of fact.”115  Having so concluded, we remanded for 
further development of the factual record. 
   
                                              
110 Id. at 514.   
111 Id.   
112 Id.   
113 715 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2013). 
114 Id. at 496 (alteration omitted) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).   
115 Id.   
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Boyle and MD Mall confirm that the availability of a 
conflict preemption defense is not automatically a question of 
law that must be kept from the jury.  The question, therefore, 
is whether there are independent jurisprudential or practical 
reasons to conclude that Wyeth preemption, specifically, 
requires a legal or a factual determination. 
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ii. Whether the FDA Would Have 
Approved a Label Change is a Factual 
Question Appropriate for the Jury 
There are no general, hard-and-fast rules that we can 
use to distinguish fact questions from legal ones.116  The 
Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that “the 
appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact 
from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive.”117  
In the absence of a governing principle, we look to the 
fact/law distinctions drawn by our court in similar cases, 
practical considerations regarding the allocation of decision-
making authority between judge and jury, and the text of 
Wyeth itself.  What we discern from these sources is that the 
question at the heart of the Wyeth test—would the FDA have 
approved the label change plaintiffs argue was required?—is 
little different from the type of fact questions that are 
routinely given to a jury. 
 
At root, Wyeth requires the decisionmaker to use an 
existing fact record to predict the outcome of a hypothetical 
scenario.  The question posed to the decisionmaker in this 
case is: based on the contemporaneous medical literature and 
the interactions between Merck and the FDA that actually did 
happen, what would have happened if Merck had proposed 
the warning plaintiffs say was required?  We think this 
question is one of fact, for three reasons. 
                                              
116 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) 
(the Supreme Court has not devised a “rule or principle that 
will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal 
conclusion”). 
117 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). 
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First, we have recognized that an assessment of the 
probability of a future event should generally be categorized 
as a finding of fact, even if that finding automatically 
generates a legal consequence.  In Kaplun v. Attorney 
General of the United States,118 we held that a determination 
of the probability of future torture was a fact question subject 
to clear-error review.  In so doing, we observed in general 
terms that “[a] present probability of a future event is 
something distinct from its legal effect that is made up of 
facts and actually exists but is not a tangible thing, or actual 
occurrence.”119  Even though the future event has not 
occurred, and even if the prediction as to that event’s 
likelihood is dispositive of a legal issue, “the likelihood itself 
remains a factual finding that can be made ex ante the actual 
outcome.”120  The Kaplun panel cited a number of other non-
immigration cases in which we or other circuits have held that 
inferences drawn from historical facts concerning the 
                                              
118 602 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2010). 
119 Id. at 269 (alterations and internal quotations omitted). 
120 Id. at 269-70.  In other words, the likelihood of an event 
occurring “is what a decision-maker in an adjudicatory 
system decides now as part of a factual framework for 
determining legal effect.”  Id. at 269.   
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likelihood of future events are findings of fact, not law.121  
Here, the corresponding conclusion is that the task of 
assessing the probability that the FDA would have rejected a 
particular warning is a factual inquiry rather than a legal 
one.122 
 
Second, Wyeth requires the decisionmaker to weigh 
conflicting evidence and draw inferences from the facts—
                                              
121 See United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 
2006) (whether the release of an individual creates a 
substantial risk of future danger to society is a finding of 
fact); Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 900 
(3d Cir. 1991) (inferences from historical facts are factual 
findings reviewed for clear error); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 
F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (district 
court’s finding as to the risk of future prison violence based 
on conflicting evidence was a factual determination reviewed 
for clear error). 
122 We recognize that the Wyeth test is something of an 
oddity.  In a typical case, the historical facts are in dispute 
and the jury is tasked with figuring out what actually 
happened.  In the case before us, the historical facts are 
largely undisputed, and the primary disputed fact is the 
ultimate fact of what would have happened.  This fact is in 
turn wholly determinative of the legal question.  The law is 
clear, however, that “an issue does not lose its factual 
character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the 
ultimate constitutional question.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 113.  
That is the same basic conclusion we reached in Kaplun: just 
because a fact finding completely resolves a legal issue does 
not alter its fundamentally “factual” character. 
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tasks that the Supreme Court tells us “are jury functions, not 
those of a judge.”123   
The present case is illustrative.  Plaintiffs, for their 
part, rely heavily on the May 2009 letter from Dr. Scott 
Monroe of the FDA rejecting Merck’s proposed warning.  
According to Plaintiffs, the text of this letter demonstrates 
that the FDA (or at least Dr. Monroe) objected only to the 
allegedly misleading term “stress fractures,” and does not 
establish that the FDA was unconvinced of the link between 
bisphosphonate use and atypical femur fractures.  Merck, 
meanwhile, directs our attention away from Dr. Monroe’s 
letter and instead toward a series of informal FDA 
communications from the same time period between Dr. 
Monroe and Merck, which they claim demonstrate that the 
FDA (or at least Dr. Monroe) was unconvinced of a 
scientifically-proven link between bisphosphonates and 
atypical fractures.124  In short: both sides ask us to (1) draw 
competing inferences from separate pieces of record evidence 
and (2) weigh those inferences against one another.  These are 
tasks reserved for jurors, not judges. 
 
Third, the task of predicting the FDA’s likely actions 
requires multiple assessments of FDA officials’ motives and 
thought processes.  Consider, for example, some of the 
questions that must be answered to arrive at a determination 
of whether the FDA would have rejected Plaintiffs’ warning.  
How convinced or skeptical were FDA officials of the link 
between bisphosphonates and atypical femur fractures?  Even 
if FDA officials were unconvinced of a firm link, might they 
                                              
123 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
124 See A 1498, 1971. 
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nonetheless have agreed that there was “reasonable evidence 
of a causal association,” as the CBE regulation requires?  Did 
the FDA reject Merck’s 2009 proposal because it was 
unconvinced by the science or because it disliked the stress-
fracture language?  What, if anything, can we infer from Dr. 
Monroe’s contemporaneous oral statement that the 
“conflicting nature of the literature” concerning a possible 
fracture link “does not provide a clear path forward”?  
Whatever the FDA’s position might have been on the 
association between bisphosphonates and atypical femur 
fractures, was that position an accurate predictor of its likely 
response to a proposed warning?  In other words, how 
confidently can we extrapolate FDA officials’ hypothetical 
reactions from their previous statements and actions?  
 
These are all, essentially, inquiries about motive or 
state of mind: what were FDA officials thinking, and how 
would that disposition have conditioned their response to 
plaintiffs’ hypothetical proposed warning?  And questions of 
motive, intent, and state of mind are typically understood to 
be fact questions committed to the jury rather than the 
court.125  
                                              
125 See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288 (“Treating issues 
of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is 
commonplace.”); Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 
405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Motive is a question of fact that must be 
decided by the jury”); Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 
116, 125 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he issue of state of mind will 
always be a question of fact”).   
One might object that the FDA acts as a body rather than 
through individuals, thereby rendering questions of “motive” 
and “intent” irrelevant in this setting.  The key evidence in 
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this case belies that assumption.  At oral argument, Merck’s 
counsel stated that the single best piece of evidence that the 
FDA would have rejected a revised warning is a set of notes, 
prepared by a Merck employee, recounting a telephone 
conversation with Dr. Monroe of the FDA—the same official 
who wrote the May 2009 letter formally rejecting Merck’s 
proposed additions to the Warnings and Precautions section.  
According to the employee’s notes, Dr. Monroe said that 
Merck’s “elevation of this issue to a precaution in the 
labeling” was prolonging review, that the “FDA would like to 
approach the issue of a precaution from the [perspective] of 
all bisphosphonates,” and that because the “conflicting nature 
of the literature does not provide a clear path forward, . . . 
more time [would] be need[ed] for [the] FDA to formulate a 
formal opinion on the issue of a precaution around these 
data.”  A 1971. 
To gauge the import of these statements, a decisionmaker 
would need to, at a minimum, (1) make a credibility 
determination regarding the Merck employee who drafted the 
notes; (2) determine the veracity and accuracy of the notes; 
(3) determine the semantic meaning of Dr. Monroe’s 
statements; (4) infer Dr. Monroe’s intent and state of mind 
when making the statements; and (5) weigh that inference 
against whatever competing inferences can be drawn from Dr. 
Monroe’s subsequent letter rejecting Merck’s proposed 
warning.  These are precisely the types of personal 
evaluations and weight-of-the-evidence assessments that we 
commit to jurors in the first instance. 
We acknowledge, of course, that the Wyeth inquiry may 
sometimes require the factfinder to impute motive or intent to 
the FDA as a whole.  But as the Supreme Court has 
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As a fallback position, Merck argues that even if the 
Wyeth inquiry is factual in nature, it should be committed to 
the court rather than the jury for reasons of institutional 
competence.126  Merck relies heavily on Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc.,127 in which the Supreme Court 
held that “construction of a patent, including terms of art 
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the 
court.”128  The Markman Court based this conclusion, in part, 
on the general rule that “[t]he construction of written 
instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are 
likely to do better than jurors.”129  Here, the question of how 
the FDA would have responded to a proposed warning is 
                                                                                                     
recognized, the difficulty of assessing collective intent is not 
a reason to treat the assessment as something other than a 
factual inquiry.  For example, the Court has held that the 
question of whether a corporation harbored discriminatory 
intent is a question of fact.  Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 
289 (“[D]iscriminatory intent . . . is not a question of law and 
not a mixed question of law and fact.”).  Here too, the 
questions of why the FDA took certain actions or what can be 
inferred from its pronouncements are questions of fact for a 
jury. 
126 See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114 (“[T]he fact/law distinction at 
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the 
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better 
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”). 
127 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
128 Id. at 372. 
129 Id. at 388. 
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informed by the regulations that constrain FDA action—in 
this case, the CBE regulation.  That regulation permits the 
FDA to add an adverse reaction in the Warnings and 
Precautions section “as soon as there is reasonable evidence 
of a causal association with a drug.”130  Agency guidance 
clarifies that “reasonable evidence” is “a standard that could 
be met by a wide range of evidence,” including evidence that 
“would not also support a higher evidentiary standard, such as 
a finding that there is a ‘preponderance’ of evidence that a 
product actually causes a particular kind of adverse event.”131  
Merck therefore claims that application of the clear evidence 
standard should be left to the courts because it “calls for the 
interpretation of regulations and agency records freighted 
with legal meaning.”132  
  
This argument misapprehends the nature of the 
factfinder’s task under Wyeth.  That task is to predict how the 
FDA would have reacted in a hypothetical scenario.  The jury 
therefore is not being asked to supply a plenary construction 
of the CBE regulation (or any other written instrument) in the 
first instance.  It is instead being asked to apply the 
requirements of that regulation to the facts, in aid of a 
prediction as to the FDA’s behavior. 
 
The operative language in the CBE regulation is 
neither uncommon nor abstruse.  The “reasonable evidence of 
a causal association” standard requires law-to-fact 
applications of the sort that courts routinely give to juries in 
                                              
130 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). 
131 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008).   
132 Merck Supp. Ltr. Br. 4. 
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tort cases.  It combines two classic jury questions: (1) whether 
a causal link between two events is too attenuated, and (2) 
whether the evidence meets a certain proof threshold.  These 
determinations are well within the province of a properly 
instructed jury, and we do not think that their inclusion in the 
larger Wyeth inquiry merits reallocation of the factfinding 
function. 
 
Plaintiffs, meanwhile, argue that judicial decision-
making is required when a preemption determination 
“depends on construction of final, written regulatory actions 
by the FDA.”133  They further claim that the FDA’s May 2009 
response letter is just such a “final” document, and urge us to 
construe it “as a matter of law.”134  We will not go so far.  As 
noted above, it is true that courts are typically charged with 
determining the construction (i.e., the legal effect) of a 
writing, as opposed to its interpretation (i.e., the semantic 
meaning of specific terms).  But that general rule has little 
bearing on the disposition of this case.  The question for 
preemption purposes is whether the FDA would have 
approved a different label amendment than the one it actually 
rejected in the May 2009 letter.  The factfinder therefore must 
parse the FDA’s May 2009 letter not to determine its legal 
effect in the first instance, but rather to discern what it 
suggests about the FDA’s likely response to a differently 
worded proposal.  This too is an appropriate task for the 
jury.135  
                                              
133 Pls. Supp. Ltr. Br. 3. 
134 Id. 4.   
135 We do not opine on Plaintiffs’ contention that the May 
2009 letter rejecting Merck’s PAS application was a “final 
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regulatory action.”  If in future cases a court is confronted 
with a formal regulatory pronouncement that has the force or 
effect of law, it may be necessary for the court to determine 
the scope of its legal effect before submitting the ultimate fact 
question to the jury.  A request for such a ruling could be 
made by motion in limine or at summary judgment.  But that 
exercise is unnecessary here because the immediate “legal” 
effect of the May 2009 letter, if any, was simply to reject 
Merck’s proposed warning.  That limited determination 
informs but does not answer the larger question of whether 
the FDA would have approved a differently-worded warning. 
Pivoting to the merits, Plaintiffs direct our attention to an 
FDA regulation stating that an FDA response letter must 
“describe all of the specific deficiencies that the agency has 
identified” in an application.  21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a).  
Plaintiffs claim that since the May 2009 FDA response letter 
did not mention any concern over the scientific evidence of a 
causal association between Fosamax and fractures, we can 
determine as a matter of law that the FDA would have 
accepted a proposal that eliminated reference to stress 
fractures.  This is a step too far.  Again, the question for the 
factfinder is whether the FDA would have approved a 
different warning from the one it rejected.  The combination 
of § 314.110’s “complete description” requirement and the 
FDA’s silence in the May 2009 response letter could certainly 
permit an inference about the FDA’s contemporaneous 
thinking, and thereby an additional inference about how the 
FDA would have responded to a different warning.  But it 
does not, and cannot, prove as a matter of law that the FDA 
would have accepted a warning of the type proposed by 
Plaintiffs.   
 57 
 
  
Accordingly, we do not see any convincing prudential 
reasons to commit the Wyeth inquiry to a court rather than a 
jury.  The basic question that Wyeth poses to a factfinder—in 
a counterfactual setting, what do you think the FDA would 
have done?—requires an evaluative inference about human 
behavior based on correspondence, agency statements, 
contemporaneous medical literature, the requirements of the 
CBE regulation, and whatever intuitions the factfinder may 
have about administrative inertia and agency decision-making 
processes.  This assessment is certainly complex, but it does 
not require any special legal competence or training.   
 
We therefore conclude that the question of whether the 
FDA would have approved a plaintiff’s proposed warning is a 
question of fact for the jury.  A state-law failure-to-warn 
claim will only be preempted if a jury concludes it is highly 
probable that the FDA would not have approved a label 
change. 
 
                                                                                                     
Nor, for that matter, are we ready to blindly accept Plaintiffs’ 
implicit assumption that Dr. Monroe, the author of the May 
2009 letter, followed § 314.110 to a T or had its requirements 
foremost in mind when drafting.  After all, Merck’s 
contention is that Dr. Monroe gave additional reasons for the 
rejection, not disclosed in the May 2009 letter, in his 
telephone communications with Merck.  We of course do not 
mean to impugn Dr. Monroe or to suggest that the May 2009 
letter did not in fact comply with § 314.110.  But the facts of 
this case demonstrate that we cannot presume the existence of 
undisputed facts based solely on anticipated compliance with 
a regulatory rule. 
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This decision would change how the preemption 
defense is presented and utilized in only a subset of cases.  As 
before, drug manufacturers are free to raise a preemption 
defense, and either party may move for summary judgment 
on this issue after discovery.  Upon summary judgment, 
district courts will compare the evidence presented with the 
evidence in Wyeth, to determine whether it is more or less 
compelling.  This is in effect what the other circuits have 
done.  A trial by jury would only be necessary in those cases 
where the evidence presented is more compelling than that in 
Wyeth but no “smoking gun” rejection letter from the FDA is 
available.  And this need not be at a great expense to either 
the litigants or the taxpayers.  A combined trial may be 
conducted on both the liability and the defense—similar to 
patent infringement cases where the plaintiffs present their 
infringement case at the same time as the defendants present 
their patent invalidity defense—particularly because the 
evidence presented will likely overlap.  In sum, today’s 
holding will not drastically change how defendants will 
litigate the preemption defense. 
   
III. ANALYSIS 
Having clarified the “clear evidence” standard, we 
now turn to the merits of Merck’s preemption defense.136  
 
Plaintiffs’ causes of action fall into three groups.  The 
first group comprises Plaintiffs’ claims that Merck failed to 
warn Fosamax users of the risk of atypical femur fractures by 
failing to add a warning to the Warnings and Precautions 
                                              
136 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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section of the label before September 2010 (the “Warnings 
and Precautions Claims”).  The second group comprises 
Plaintiffs’ claims that Merck failed to warn Fosamax users of 
the risk of femur fractures by failing to add atypical femur 
fractures to the Adverse Reactions section of the label prior to 
May 2009 (the “Adverse Reactions Claims”).  The third 
group comprises all of Plaintiffs’ non-failure-to-warn claims, 
including design defect, negligence, breach of implied and 
express warranties, and violations of state consumer fraud and 
trade practice statutes (the “Non-Warning Claims”).  The 
District Court ruled that the Warnings and Precautions claims 
were preempted under Wyeth; that the Adverse Reactions 
claims failed on the merits; and that the Non-Warning Claims 
were functionally indistinguishable from the Warnings and 
Precautions Claims and therefore preempted to the same 
extent. 
 
Plaintiffs present four arguments on appeal.  First, 
Plaintiffs argue that the Warnings and Precautions Claims are 
not preempted as a matter of law because a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the FDA would have approved a properly 
worded atypical-fractures warning.  Second, Plaintiffs argue 
that Merck is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 
Adverse Reactions Claims because those claims were 
properly pleaded and there is sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to find for the Plaintiffs.  Third, Plaintiffs 
argue that even if both sets of failure-to-warn claims are 
preempted, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are not preempted 
because they do not “sound in failure to warn” and are 
supported by competent evidence.  Fourth, Plaintiffs claim 
that the District Court misapplied Rule 56 when it tried to 
resolve Merck’s affirmative preemption defense via a show-
cause proceeding.  
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For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that (1) 
the Warnings and Precautions claims are not preempted as a 
matter of law because a reasonable jury could find it less than 
highly probable that the FDA would have rejected Plaintiffs’ 
proposed warning; (2) Merck is not entitled to summary 
judgment on the Adverse Reactions claims; and (3) the Non-
Warning Claims are not preempted as a matter of law.  
Because we are vacating the District Court’s summary 
judgment order, we do not reach the propriety of the show-
cause order. 
 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary,137 and we affirm only if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”138  Because Merck 
moved for summary judgment, we must draw all reasonable 
inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor when considering the 
evidence.139  Our inquiry is confined to “whether the evidence 
of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party.”140  We therefore cannot grant 
summary judgment in Merck’s favor “unless a reasonable 
                                              
137 Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). 
138 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
139 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.   
140 Reedy, 615 F.3d at 210. 
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juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed 
to rule in its favor on the law.”141   
 
Special considerations arise in the preemption context.  
Impossibility preemption is an affirmative defense142 on 
which Merck bears the burdens of production and 
persuasion.143  Crucially, “the inquiry involved in a ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates 
the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply 
at the trial on the merits.”144  As discussed above, Wyeth’s 
“clear evidence” standard of proof requires the manufacturer 
to prove that it is highly probable that the FDA would not 
have approved a change to the drug’s label.  Therefore, the 
question for summary judgment purposes is not just whether a 
reasonable juror could find that the FDA would have 
approved Plaintiffs’ proposed warning.  It is whether a 
reasonable juror could find that it is highly probable that the 
FDA would have rejected the warning.  Put differently: even 
if it seems possible or plausible that the FDA would have 
rejected the proposed warning, could a reasonable juror 
nonetheless conclude that the odds of rejection were 
something less than highly probable?  In El v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we said that “if there 
is a chance that a reasonable factfinder would not accept a 
moving party’s necessary propositions of fact, pre-trial 
                                              
141 El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
142 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 634. 
143 El, 479 F.3d at 237 & n.6.   
144 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
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judgment cannot be granted.”145  The corresponding 
proposition here is: if there is a chance that a reasonable 
factfinder would not find that it is highly probable that the 
FDA would have rejected Plaintiffs’ warning, pre-trial 
judgment cannot be granted.  
  
In summary: to affirm the District Court’s decision 
that the Warnings and Precautions Claims are preempted, we 
must find that no reasonable juror could conclude that it is 
anything less than highly probable that the FDA would have 
rejected Plaintiff’s proposed atypical-fracture warning had 
Merck proposed it to the FDA in September 2010.   
 
B. Merck is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment 
on Plaintiffs’ Warnings and Precautions 
Claims 
Merck’s ultimate task under Wyeth is to prove by clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved the warning 
about the link between Fosamax use and atypical femur 
fractures that Plaintiffs say was required under state law.  
Merck’s primary argument on appeal is that prior to 
September 2010, the FDA would have opposed any warning 
about atypical femur fractures in the Warnings and 
Precautions section because the FDA did not believe that the 
science supported such a warning.  As Merck points out, the 
FDA sought and analyzed information regarding atypical 
femur fractures in 2008; Merck responded with data and then 
proposed warning language for both the Warnings and 
Precautions and Adverse Reactions sections of the Fosamax 
label; the FDA rejected Merck’s proposed language for the 
                                              
145 El, 479 F.3d at 238. 
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Warnings and Precautions section; and in correspondence 
surrounding the rejection, FDA officials stated that the 
“conflicting nature of the literature does not provide a clear 
path forward,” and “more time [would] be need[ed] for [the] 
FDA to formulate a formal opinion on the issue of a 
precaution around these data.”146  Given this sequence of 
events, Merck argues that there is clear evidence that the FDA 
would not have approved a CBE submission adding an 
atypical-fracture warning to the Warnings and Precautions 
section. 
 
It is undisputed that the FDA was aware of the 
possible link between Fosamax and atypical fractures well 
before September 2010.  In March 2008, Merck submitted a 
comprehensive safety update to the FDA reporting the 
existence and results of numerous studies suggesting just such 
an association.  The FDA responded that it was concerned 
about this “safety signal,” but did not require Merck to update 
its label.147  In March 2010, after reviewing the data 
submitted by Merck and other manufacturers, the FDA stated 
that the data reviewed to date had “not shown a clear 
connection between bisphosphonate use and a risk of atypical 
subtrochanteric femur fractures.”148  And in October 2010, an 
FDA Deputy Director stated that the September 2010 task 
force report was the finding that for the first time made the 
FDA “confident” that atypical femur fractures are “potentially 
more closely related to” bisphosphonates “than [the FDA] 
                                              
146 A 1971; see also A 1498. 
147 A 1935-36. 
148 A 1508. 
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previously had evidence for.”149  Merck argues that this 
evidence demonstrates that prior to September 2010, the FDA 
would have rejected any CBE application that attempted to 
add an atypical fractures warning to the Fosamax label 
because the FDA had concluded that there was no reasonable 
evidence of a causal link. 
 
Merck also emphasizes the FDA’s April 2009 e-mail 
asking Merck to “hold off on the [Warnings and Precautions] 
language at this time” so that drug evaluators could “work 
with [the FDA’s Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology] 
and Merck to decide on language for a [Warnings and 
Precautions] atypical fracture language, if it is warranted.”150  
After the task force issued its report in September 2010, by 
contrast, the FDA revised Merck’s proposed language and 
quickly approved a label amendment.  Merck argues that the 
“only logical conclusion from this course of proceedings is 
that the FDA thought adequate scientific support showing a 
connection between bisphosphonates and atypical femur 
fractures was lacking in 2009 but present in 2010 after the 
[task force] report, all of which accords with the FDA’s 
public statements on the issue.”151 
 
Merck also rejects Plaintiffs’ theory that the FDA 
rejected Merck’s proposed warning based on a “language 
quibble” about stress fractures rather than a fundamental 
disagreement about the science.  Merck’s strongest argument 
for summary judgment is that Plaintiffs’ theory of the case 
                                              
149 A 1396. 
150 A 1498 (emphasis added). 
151 Merck Br. 50. 
 65 
 
rests on an unreasonable inference: that the FDA 
(1) recognized a need to include risk information about 
atypical femur fractures and therefore would have accepted a 
properly-worded warning about such fractures, but (2) was so 
troubled by the “stress fracture” language that it “preferred to 
deprive physicians of that risk information rather than allow 
Merck to add its proposed language or authorize inclusion of 
revised language.”152  Merck buttresses this argument by 
pointing to statutory language requiring the FDA to notify a 
drug manufacturer when it “becomes aware of new safety 
information that [it] believes should be included in the 
labeling of the drug” and to “initiate discussions to reach 
agreement on whether the labeling for the drug should be 
modified to reflect the new safety information” if it is 
dissatisfied with the manufacturer’s response.153  Merck 
points out that if the FDA actually thought that an atypical-
fracture warning was warranted, it could have proposed 
revisions rather than simply rejecting Merck’s proposal.  The 
FDA engaged in just such a revision process in 2010 after it 
directed Merck to add a warning and Merck responded by 
adding stress-fracture language.  The fact that the FDA did 
not similarly reach out in 2009, Merck says, demonstrates that 
it would not have accepted Plaintiffs’ proposed warning prior 
to the issuance of the task force report in September 2010. 
 
We do not discount the force of this evidence or its 
potential to sway a jury.  The problem for Merck, however, is 
that we are not assessing in the first instance whether there 
was clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a 
                                              
152 Id. 48. 
153 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o)(4)(A) and (C).   
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change.  We are instead trying to anticipate whether a 
reasonable juror, looking at all the evidence and trying to 
reconstruct a hypothetical event, could conclude that it is less 
than highly probable that the FDA would have rejected the 
change.  And crucially for the Plaintiffs, we are drawing all 
reasonable inferences in their favor.  This confers a unique 
advantage when the factfinder’s task is to guess what could 
have happened in a counterfactual setting. 
 
Plaintiffs’ argument against preemption centers on two 
claims: first, that there was sufficient evidence of a causal 
link to allow Merck to unilaterally amend the Fosamax label 
via the CBE process; and second, that the FDA’s rejection of 
Merck’s PAS application was based on Merck’s misleading 
use of the term “stress fractures” rather than any fundamental 
disagreement with the underlying science.  In our view, a 
reasonable jury could accept both contentions and conclude 
that the FDA would not have rejected Plaintiffs’ proposed 
warning—or, at least, that the FDA was not highly probable 
to do so. 
 
First, a reasonable jury could conclude that Merck 
could have amended the Fosamax label via the CBE process.  
To add a warning to the Warnings and Precautions section of 
a drug label through a CBE submission, “there need only be 
‘reasonable’ evidence of a causal association with the drug, a 
standard that could be met by a wide range of evidence.”154  
To gain FDA approval, therefore, the agency does not need to 
                                              
154 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,604.  The same “reasonable evidence” 
standard that governs whether a manufacturer can submit a 
CBE application also governs whether the FDA should 
approve it.  21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). 
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be affirmatively convinced of a causal link between the drug 
and the adverse event.  Here, there is evidence that the FDA 
recognized a fracture risk and the possible need for warnings 
before September 2010.    In June 2008, for example, the 
FDA stated that it was “aware of reports regarding the 
occurrence of subtrochanteric hip fractures in patients using 
bisphosphonates,” that these and atypical femoral fractures 
were “reportedly rare in patients with osteoporosis not on 
bisphosphonates,” and that it was “concerned about this 
developing safety signal.”155  And in May 2009, the FDA 
approved Merck’s request to add a reference to “low energy 
femoral shaft and subtrochanteric fractures” in the Adverse 
Reactions section of the label.156  Even if the FDA did not 
perceive a “clear connection” between Fosamax and atypical 
fractures, as it said in early 2010, a juror could conclude that 
the FDA would still have determined that “reasonable 
evidence” of a link existed—or more precisely, that the 
possibility of rejection was less than highly probable. 
   
                                              
155 A 1145. 
156 A 1500-01.  As Plaintiffs point out, warnings can only be 
added to the Adverse Reactions section if they are 
“reasonably associated with use of’” a drug and “there is 
some basis to believe there is a causal relationship between 
the drug and the occurrence of the adverse event.”  21 C.F.R. 
§ 201.57(c)(7) (FDA regulation describing requirements of 
“Adverse Reactions” section of label).   A juror could 
therefore infer from the FDA’s approval of the Adverse 
Reactions language that the FDA would have also agreed that 
there was “reasonable evidence of a causal association” 
between Fosamax and atypical femoral fractures. 
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Second, a reasonable jury could also conclude that the 
FDA rejected Merck’s proposed warning about femoral 
fractures in 2009 not because it denied the existence of a 
causal link between Fosamax and fractures, but because 
Merck repeatedly characterized the fractures at issue as 
“stress fractures.”  Merck’s proposed warning used the phrase 
“stress fractures” six times.157  According to Plaintiffs’ expert, 
                                              
157 The following is the text of Merck’s proposed addition to 
the Warnings and Precautions section, with references to 
“stress fractures” bolded: 
Low-Energy Femoral Shaft Fracture 
Low-energy fractures of the subtrochanteric and 
proximal femoral shaft have been reported in a 
small number of bisphosphonate-treated 
patients. Some were stress fractures (also 
known as insufficiency fractures) occurring in 
the absence of trauma. Some patients 
experienced prodromal pain in the affected area, 
often associated with imaging features of 
stress fracture, weeks to months before a 
complete fracture occurred. The number of 
reports of this condition is very low, and stress 
fractures with similar clinical features also 
have occurred in patients not treated with 
bisphosphonates. Patients with suspected 
stress fractures should be evaluated, including 
evaluation for known causes and risk factors 
(e.g., vitamin D deficiency, malabsorption, 
glucocorticoid use, previous stress fracture, 
lower extremity arthritis or fracture, extreme or 
increased exercise, diabetes mellitus, chronic 
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stress fractures are commonly seen in physically active 
people; atypical femoral fractures are, as the name suggests, 
highly unusual.158  Stress fractures are usually incomplete 
fractures that heal with rest, while atypical femoral fractures 
often are complete fractures that require surgical 
intervention.159  The FDA’s response to Merck’s PAS 
application stated: “Your justification for the proposed 
PRECAUTIONS section language is inadequate.  
Identification of ‘stress fractures’ may not be clearly related 
to the atypical subtrochanteric features that have been 
reported in the literature.  Discussion of the risk factors for 
stress fractures is not warranted and is not adequately 
supported by the available literature and post-marketing 
adverse event reporting.”160  The FDA did not give any other 
reason for rejecting Merck’s proposed warning. 
   
In 2010, when Merck attempted to revise the FDA’s 
proposed warning by adding references to stress fractures, the 
                                                                                                     
alcohol abuse), and receive appropriate 
orthopedic care. Interruption of bisphosphonate 
therapy in patients with stress fractures 
should be considered, pending evaluation of the 
patient, based on individual benefit/risk 
assessment.  A 2720. 
158 A 868 ¶ 22; A 881 ¶ 74; A 882 ¶ 76; see also A 1147 (task 
force report describing atypical femoral fractures as occurring 
with “relative rarity”). 
159 A 884 ¶ 83-84; see also A 1149 (task force report 
describing atypical femoral fractures as “[c]omplete 
fractures”). 
160 A 1500-01. 
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FDA again struck out the stress-fracture references.  It 
explained that “the term ‘stress fracture’ was considered and 
was not accepted” because “for most practitioners, the term 
‘stress fracture’ represents a minor fracture and this would 
contradict the seriousness of the atypical femoral fractures 
associated with bisphosphonate use.”161 
 
As discussed above, Merck argues that if the FDA had 
been truly concerned about the risk of atypical fractures, it 
could have revised and approved a warning without the 
offending stress-fracture references.  As a matter of law, 
however, the burden and the responsibility to correct a drug 
label rests with the manufacturer, not the FDA.162  Once the 
FDA rejected Merck’s proposal, the ball was back in Merck’s 
court to submit a revised, corrected proposal.  A reasonable 
juror could therefore conclude that it was Merck’s failure to 
re-submit a revised CBE or PAS without stress-fracture 
language, rather than the FDA’s supposedly intransigent 
stance on the science, that prevented the FDA from approving 
a label change. 
 
                                              
161 A1540. 
162 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570-71 (“[T]hrough many 
amendments to the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it has 
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the 
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at 
all times.”); 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(I) (“Rule of construction” 
clarifying that the 2007 FDCA amendments “shall not be 
construed to affect the responsibility of the responsible person 
. . . to maintain its label in accordance with existing 
requirements”).   
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Plaintiffs’ evidence certainly does not compel the 
conclusion that the FDA would have accepted an atypical 
fracture warning that omitted the language about stress 
fractures.  But our inquiry at this stage is not about who has 
the best evidence; it is about what a reasonable jury applying 
a heightened standard of proof could conclude on the basis of 
the evidence.  Because the Wyeth test requires the factfinder 
to speculate about hypothetical scenarios using inferences 
drawn from historical facts, reasonable jurors could reach a 
broad range of conclusions when confronted with this record.  
To that inherent uncertainty we then add all the reasonable 
inferences that Rule 56 requires us to draw in Plaintiffs’ 
favor: the FDA would have agreed that the evidence of an 
association was “reasonable” prior to 2010; the FDA rejected 
Merck’s proposed warning because it was primarily 
concerned with the misleading references to stress fractures 
rather than the underlying science; the FDA refrained from 
counter-proposing an acceptable warning in 2009 because it 
considered it Merck’s responsibility to submit a revised 
warning; the FDA affirmatively reached out to Merck in 2010 
because it recognized that the science was now so strong that 
amending the label was a legal imperative, not because it was 
acknowledging a sufficient risk for the first time. 
   
A reasonable juror reviewing the evidence in this case 
could find it less than highly probable that the FDA would not 
have approved a warning about the risk of atypical femur 
fractures that eliminated or revised references to “stress 
fractures.”  Accordingly, Merck is not entitled to summary 
judgment on its preemption defense to Plaintiffs’ Warnings 
and Precautions claims.163 
                                              
163 Our ruling today concerns only the correctness of the 
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District Court’s March 24, 2014 decision that Merck was 
entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative preemption 
defense.  We express no view as to whether or how our ruling 
should be applied to any individual action in the MDL going 
forward. 
One of the reasons Merck gave for treating Wyeth preemption 
as a pure question of law was that doing so would allegedly 
ensure consistency of its application across the hundreds of 
claims in this MDL.  We of course do not decide issues by 
considering how many lawsuits our ruling will extinguish or 
revive.  At any rate, the suits in this MDL pose numerous 
binary jury questions that conceivably apply across the board.  
Fosamax either causes atypical femoral fractures or it does 
not; Merck either knew about the alleged risks of fracture or it 
did not; the risks of Fosamax either outweighed its benefits or 
they did not; the list goes on.  Ontologically speaking, there is 
an “objective” right answer to each of these questions that 
does not vary from case to case. And treating each issue as 
one of pure law to be disposed at a swoop of the judge’s pen 
would certainly speed matters along.  But neither 
consideration is an adequate basis to shift the traditional line 
between judge and jury functions.  Of course, if the 
manufacturer shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact bearing on Wyeth preemption, then a judge can 
indeed decide as a matter of law that the defense is 
established.  But that showing was not made here.  The FDA 
either would have approved Plaintiffs’ warning or they would 
not; we cannot say.   
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C. Merck is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment 
on Plaintiffs’ Adverse Reactions Claims 
Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims focus primarily on 
the assertion that Merck should have added a fractures 
warning to the Warnings and Precautions section of the 
Fosamax label prior to September 2010.  But Plaintiffs also 
contend that their failure-to-warn claims encompass a related 
but distinct allegation that Merck should have added atypical 
fractures to the Adverse Reactions section prior to May 2009 
(the date the FDA actually approved Merck’s addition of 
atypical fractures to the Adverse Reactions section), and that 
Merck’s failure to do so proximately caused their injuries.164  
The District Court ruled that this claim was insufficiently pled 
and not supported by the evidence, and entered summary 
judgment for Merck on the merits.  This ruling was in error. 
 
                                                                                                     
Treating preemption as a jury issue does not automatically 
condemn Merck to a thousand individual jury trials.  The 
MDL parties could, for example, hold a bellwether trial on 
the preemption question, after which the prevailing party 
would be free to argue that the other side should be 
collaterally estopped from re-litigating preemption in 
individual cases.  See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391 (recognizing 
that treating a question as a factual issue does not leave it 
“wide open in every new court” because “principles of issue 
preclusion would ordinarily foster uniformity”).  Again, we 
express no view on the merits or likely outcomes of such an 
approach. 
164 See A 1501. 
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As an initial matter, the Adverse Reaction Claims are 
not preempted by Wyeth, and Merck does not argue 
otherwise.  Merck requested that atypical fractures be added 
to the Adverse Reactions section in 2009, and the FDA 
approved the request.  Merck has not shown by clear evidence 
that the FDA would have rejected such a warning had Merck 
proposed it earlier. 
 
Turning to the merits, the District Court dismissed the 
Adverse Reactions claims on two grounds.165  The first basis 
for the District Court’s ruling was its conclusion that 
Plaintiffs did not specifically plead a failure-to-warn claim 
based on the Adverse Reactions label section in any of their 
complaints.  Whether or not this is an accurate assessment—
we do not have every MDL complaint before us to confirm, 
and there is no indication that the District Court reviewed 
each of the hundreds of complaints at issue either—we think 
it beside the point.  Plaintiffs direct us to a number of 
complaints alleging generally that the Fosamax label did not 
adequately warn patients and doctors of the fracture risk, 
without specifying the particular warnings that should have 
been included or the particular failings of each label 
                                              
165 Although it does not appear to have been a basis for its 
decision, the District Court observed that a large number of 
Plaintiffs alleged injuries occurring after the FDA added the 
Adverse Reactions warning.  According to the District Court, 
these Plaintiffs would only be able to assert a failure-to-warn 
claim based on the absence of a warning in the Warnings and 
Precautions section of the label.  We disagree, as these 
Plaintiffs remain free to argue that their injuries were caused 
by their use of Fosamax prior to the addition of the Adverse 
Reactions warning. 
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section.166  The parties and the District Court all accept that 
these general allegations adequately pled the Warnings and 
Precautions theory discussed above.  It is therefore difficult to 
understand why the District Court faulted the same 
complaints for failing to specify every section of the label that 
should have included a warning.  At any rate, such specificity 
is not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.167  
Merck does not argue that the complaints failed to put it on 
notice of the Adverse Reactions claim, and that concession 
closes the door on any claim that the complaints themselves 
failed to adequately plead the Adverse Reactions theory. 
 
The District Court also stated, without elaboration, that 
Plaintiffs had failed to “set forth evidence indicating that any 
doctor would not have prescribed Fosamax if the occurrence 
of low-energy femoral shaft fractures had been mentioned in 
the Adverse Reactions section prior to 2009.”168  Even if true, 
this does not justify summary judgment on the merits.  The 
proper inquiry for summary judgment purposes is whether 
there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to 
conclude that a doctor would not have prescribed Fosamax if 
fracture language had been added to the Adverse Reactions 
section prior to 2009.  To this end, Plaintiffs submitted 
several declarations from their treating physicians declaring 
                                              
166 See A 2245 ¶ 54, 2249 ¶ 76, 2190 ¶ 123, 2333 ¶ 57. 
167 See Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 
132 (2d Cir. 2010) (complaint need not specify the legal 
theory underlying its claims so long as it contains sufficient 
facts to support liability); Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).   
168 Summary Judgment Order, 2014 WL 1266994, at *15. 
 76 
 
that if they had been informed that Fosamax posed a risk of 
femoral fractures, they likely would not have prescribed 
Fosamax or likely would have discontinued treatment.169  
These declarations do not specify which sections of the label 
should have contained such a warning.  A reasonable juror 
could conclude that some of these physicians would not have 
prescribed Fosamax if atypical femur fractures had been 
listed in the Adverse Reactions section.  Accordingly, the 
District Court should not have granted Merck summary 
judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ Adverse Reactions 
failure-to-warn claims. 
 
There is a deeper problem lurking in the District 
Court’s decision to grant Merck a merits judgment in all of 
the MDL cases.  A mass tort MDL is not a class action.  It is a 
collection of separate lawsuits that are coordinated for pretrial 
proceedings—and only pretrial proceedings—before being 
remanded to their respective transferor courts.170  Some 
purely legal issues may apply in every case.  But merits 
questions that are predicated on the existence or non-
existence of historical facts unique to each Plaintiff—e.g., 
whether a particular Plaintiff’s doctor would have read a 
warning in the Adverse Reactions section and ceased 
prescribing Fosamax as a result—generally are not amenable 
to across-the-board resolution.  Each Plaintiff deserves the 
opportunity to develop those sort of facts separately, and the 
District Court’s understandable desire to streamline 
proceedings cannot override the Plaintiffs’ basic trial 
                                              
169 See, e.g., A 792 ¶ 10, 794 ¶ 9, 796-97 ¶ 9, 798 ¶ 8. 
170 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
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rights.171  As a technical matter, Merck’s actual burden at the 
summary judgment stage was to prove that there is no 
genuine dispute in every single MDL case that Plaintiffs’ 
doctors would have continued to prescribe Fosamax even if 
the fracture warning had been added to the Adverse Reactions 
section before May 2009.  It could not do so, and the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits was 
therefore erroneous. 
 
D. Merck is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment 
on Plaintiffs’ Non-Warning Claims 
The District Court held that Plaintiffs’ Non-Warning 
Claims sounded in failure to warn and were therefore 
preempted to the same extent as the Warning and Precautions 
Claims.  Accordingly, our decision vacating the District 
Court’s preemption ruling as to the Warnings and Precautions 
                                              
171 The District Court and the parties could have, but did not, 
choose to have the Plaintiffs assemble a single “master 
complaint” that superseded the individual complaints.  See In 
re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d 586, 
590-91 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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Claims reinstates the Non-Warning Claims as well.172  We 
pass no judgment on the merits of those claims or on whether 
they do in fact sound in failure to warn. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to Merck and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
172 Merck argues that the non-warning claims are separately 
preempted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).  
Merck admits, however, that it did not raise this argument 
below—indeed, Merck appears to have explicitly disavowed 
the argument so it could characterize its defense as being 
based solely on Wyeth.  Merck Br. 68; A 1727-28.  “It is well 
established that arguments not raised before the District Court 
are waived on appeal.”  DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 
123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).  We see no reason to deviate 
from that rule here. 
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